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Publications | Prof. Eyal Pe'er

Publications

2015
Chandler, J. et al., 2015. Using Nonnaive Participants Can Reduce Effect Sizes. Psychological Science, 26(7), pp.1131-1139. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract

Although researchers often assume their participants are naive to experimental materials, this is not always the case. We investigated how prior exposure to a task affects subsequent experimental results. Participants in this study completed the same set of 12 experimental tasks at two points in time, first as a part of the Many Labs replication project and again a few days, a week, or a month later. Effect sizes were markedly lower in the second wave than in the first. The reduction was most pronounced when participants were assigned to a different condition in the second wave. We discuss the methodological implications of these findings.

Egelman, S. & Peer, E., 2015. Predicting privacy and security attitudes. Computers & Society, 45(1), p.22. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract

While individual differences in decision-making have been examined within the social sciences for several decades, this research has only recently begun to be applied by computer scientists to examine privacy and security attitudes (and ultimately behaviors). Specifically, several researchers have shown how different online privacy decisions are correlated with the "Big Five" personality traits. However, in our own research, we show that the five factor model is actually a weak predictor of privacy preferences and behaviors, and that other well-studied individual differences in the psychology literature are much stronger predictors. We describe the results of several experiments that showed how decision-making style and risk-taking attitudes are strong predictors of privacy attitudes, as well as a new scale that we developed to measure security behavior intentions. Finally, we show that privacy and security attitudes are correlated, but orthogonal.

Egelman, S. & Peer, E., 2015. Scaling the security wall: Developing a security behavior intentions scale (SeBIS). Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems Proceedings, p.2873. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract

Despite the plethora of security advice and online education materials offered to end-users, there exists no standard measurement tool for end-user security behaviors. We present the creation of such a tool. We surveyed the most common computer security advice that experts offer to end-users in order to construct a set of Likert scale questions to probe the extent to which respondents claim to follow this advice. Using these questions, we iteratively surveyed a pool of 3,619 computer users to refine our question set such that each question was applicable to a large percentage of the population, exhibited adequate variance between respondents, and had high reliability (i.e., desirable psychometric properties). After performing both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, we identified a 16-item scale consisting of four sub-scales that measures attitudes towards choosing passwords, device securement, staying up-to-date, and proactive awareness.

2014
Peer, E. & Babad, E., 2014. The Doctor Fox research (1973) rerevisited:“Educational seduction” ruled out. Journal of Educational Psychology, 106(1), pp.36-45. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract

 

In their study about the Dr. Fox lecture, Naftulin, Ware, and Donnelly (1973) claimed that an expressive speaker who delivered an attractive lecture devoid of any content could seduce students into believing that they had learned something significant. Over the decades, the study has been (and still is) cited hundreds of times and used by opponents of the measurement of student evaluations of teachers (SET) as empirical proof for the lack of validity of SET. In an attempt to formulate an alternative explanation of the findings, we replicated the 1973 study, using the original video of the lecture and following the exact methodology of the original study. The alternative explanations tested on several samples of students included (a) acquiescence bias (via a reversed questionnaire and a cognitive remedy); (b) ignorance bias (participants’ lack of familiarity with the lecture content); (c) status/prestige bias (presentation of the speaker as a world authority); and (d) a direct measurement of students’ reports about their presumed learning. The Dr. Fox effect was indeed consistently replicated in all samples. However, the originally proposed notion of educational seduction leading to presumable (illusory) student learning was ruled out by the empirical findings: Students indeed enjoyed the entertaining lecture, but they had not been seduced into believing they had learned. We discuss the relevance of metacognitive considerations to the inclusion of self-reported learning in this study, and to the wider issue of the incorporation of student learning in the contemporary measurement of SET.

 

Peer, E., Vosgerau, J. & Acquisti, A., 2014. Reputation as a sufficient condition for data quality on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Behavior Research Methods, 46(4), pp.1023-1031. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract

Data quality is one of the major concerns of using crowdsourcing websites such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to recruit participants for online behavioral studies. We compared two methods for ensuring data quality on MTurk: attention check questions (ACQs) and restricting participation to MTurk workers with high reputation (above 95% approval ratings). In Experiment 1, we found that high-reputation workers rarely failed ACQs and provided higher-quality data than did low-reputation workers; ACQs improved data quality only for low-reputation workers, and only in some cases. Experiment 2 corroborated these findings and also showed that more productive high-reputation workers produce the highest-quality data. We concluded that sampling high-reputation workers can ensure high-quality data without having to resort to using ACQs, which may lead to selection bias if participants who fail ACQs are excluded post-hoc.

Peer, E., Acquisti, A. & Shalvi, S., 2014. ''I cheated, but only a little'': Partial confessions to unethical behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106(2), p.202. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract

Confessions are people’s way of coming clean, sharing unethical acts with others. Although confessions are traditionally viewed as categorical—one either comes clean or not—people often confess to only part of their transgression. Such partial confessions may seem attractive, because they offer an opportunity to relieve one’s guilt without having to own up to the full consequences of the transgression. In this article, we explored the occurrence, antecedents, consequences, and everyday prevalence of partial confessions. Using a novel experimental design, we found a high frequency of partial confessions, especially among people cheating to the full extent possible. People found partial confessions attractive because they (correctly) expected partial confessions to be more believable than not confessing. People failed, however, to anticipate the emotional costs associated with partially confessing. In fact, partial confessions made people feel worse than not confessing or fully confessing, a finding corroborated in a laboratory setting as well as in a study assessing people’s everyday confessions. It seems that although partial confessions seem attractive, they come at an emotional cost.

Bar-Hillel, M., Peer, E. & Acquisti, A., 2014. "Heads or Tails?" - A Reachability Bias in Binary Choice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 40(6), pp.1656-1663. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract
When asked to mentally simulate coin tosses, people generate sequences that differ systematically from those generated by fair coins. It has been rarely noted that this divergence is apparent already in the very 1st mental toss. Analysis of several existing data sets reveals that about 80% of respondents start their sequence with Heads. We attributed this to the linguistic convention describing coin toss outcomes as 'Heads or Tails,' not vice versa. However, our subsequent experiments found the 'first-toss' bias reversible under minor changes in the experimental setup, such as mentioning Tails before Heads in the instructions. We offer a comprehensive account in terms of a novel response bias, which we call reachability. It is more general than the 1st-toss bias, and it reflects the relative ease of reaching 1 option compared to its alternative in any binary choice context. When faced with a choice between 2 options (e.g., Heads and Tails, when 'tossing' mental coins), whichever of th
2013
Gamliel, E. & Peer, E., 2013. Explicit risk of getting caught does not affect unethical behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 43(6), pp.1281-1288. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract

Research showed that given the opportunity, people behave dishonestly only to the degree that will allow them to maintain a positive self‐concept. These experiments did not include the probability of getting caught cheating, although in everyday life, this risk always exists. If it is shown that people behave more honestly when faced with an explicit risk of getting caught, the ecological validity of these experiments may be at risk. This study showed that explicit risk, framed as the probability of getting caught or as the complementary probability of not getting caught, did not reduce participants’ dishonest behavior relative to no risk. These findings support the ecological validity of previous research on unethical behavior. 

Gamliel, E. & Peer, E., 2013. Explicit risk of getting caught does not affect unethical behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, (6), p.1281. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract
Byline: Eyal Gamliel, Eyal Peer Abstract Research showed that given the opportunity, people behave dishonestly only to the degree that will allow them to maintain a positive self-concept. These experiments did not include the probability of getting caught cheating, although in everyday life, this risk always exists. If it is shown that people behave more honestly when faced with an explicit risk of getting caught, the ecological validity of these experiments may be at risk. This study showed that explicit risk, framed as the probability of getting caught or as the complementary probability of not getting caught, did not reduce participants' dishonest behavior relative to no risk. These findings support the ecological validity of previous research on unethical behavior. Author Affiliation: Article Note: A previous version of this study was presented at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making.
Eyal, P. & Eyal, G., 2013. Pace yourself: Improving time-saving judgments when increasing activity speed. Judgment and Decision Making, 8(2), pp.106-115. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract
The time-saving bias describes people's tendency to misestimate the time they can save by increasing the speed in which they perform an activity such as driving or completing a task. People typically underestimate time saved when increasing from a low speed and overestimate time saved when increasing from an already high speed. We suggest that this bias is the result of people's failure to recognize the curvilinear relationship between increasing speed and reducing activity time: As initial speed rises, the same speed increases will yield smaller reductions in time. We explore a new technique to de-bias these faulty estimations: converting measurements of speed to a pace measure (e.g., minutes per fixed distance). Utilizing common driving scenarios, we show that participants who received pace data made more accurate estimations of journey duration at various speeds, time-savings at various speed increases and the required speed to complete a journey.
Peer, E. & Rosenbloom, T., 2013. When two motivations race: The effects of time-saving bias and sensation-seeking on driving speed choices. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 50, pp.1135 - 1139. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract
Time-saving bias—people's biased judgments in estimating the time saved when increasing speed—has been found to strongly impact driving speed choices. However, this bias may be relevant only when the driver's motivation for increasing speed is to arrive sooner. If, on the other hand, the driver is motivated by the desire to experience thrill and sensation, a driver's level of sensation-seeking might better explain choices of speed. In this study, participants were asked to estimate the journey time when increasing speed and to estimate the speed required to arrive on time. They also indicated the speed they would personally choose in such a situation. Next, participants filled out Zuckerman's (1994) Sensation Seeking Scale. Results showed that both time-saving estimations and the Disinhibition scale of Sensation Seeking (as well as drivers’ gender) contributed independently and additively to drivers’ choice of speed and that time-saving bias’ role was somewhat stronger than sensation-
2012
Peer, E. & Gamliel, E., 2012. Estimating time savings: The use of the proportion and percentage heuristics and the role of need for cognition. Acta Psychologica, 141(3), pp.352-359. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract

People generally overestimate the time they can save when increasing from a relatively high driving speed. Previous research suggested that people follow a Proportion Heuristic, calculating the time saved as the proportion of speed increase from the new higher speed. The present study suggests that drivers use another heuristic – the Percentage Heuristic – to calculate how much time they save by increasing speed. In the percentage heuristic, the initial (rather than higher) speed is used as the denominator. Using a discriminating set of questions, we classified participants' responses as normative (correct answer), as following the proportion or percentage heuristic, or some other strategy. We found that participants used the percentage heuristic more often, perhaps because it predicts linearly increasing values of time saved when increasing speed. In addition, we found that participants high in need for cognition (NFC) gave correct answers more often than low NFC participants who relied more on heuristics.

Babad, E., Peer, E. & Benayoun, Y., 2012. Can Multiple Biases Occur in a Single Situation? Evidence From Media Bias Research. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 42(6), pp.1486 - 1504. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract
This study explored multiple biases-the possibility that different biases would concurrently occur in a given situation, and each would exert its influence independently on people's judgments. The study focused on media bias through nonverbal (NV) behavior, where viewers judged an interviewed politician after they viewed the interview with a nonverbally friendly or hostile interviewer. In a meta-analysis of several replications, 2 independent biases were found: media bias (viewers rated the interviewee more favorably when the interviewer's NV behavior was friendlier); and halo effect (viewers rated the interviewee according to the degree that they personally liked him). Regression analyses indicated that these 2 biases operated independently and additively on viewers' judgments. Implications for the study of multiple biases are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Babad, E., Peer, E. & Hobbs, R., 2012. Media literacy and media bias: Are media literacy students less susceptible to nonverbal judgment biases? Psychology of Popular Media Culture, 1(2), pp.97 - 107. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract
Past research has shown that people judge a TV interviewee more favorably when the interviewer's nonverbal behavior toward the interviewee is friendly rather than hostile. This study examined whether students who participated in a media literacy course could be less susceptible to this media bias. Two groups of high school students (media literacy students and a control group) were shown a brief interview in which the interviewer's nonverbal behavior was friendly or hostile toward the interviewed politician. Results showed that the control group showed a nonverbal media bias effect and judged the interviewee more favorably when the interviewer was friendlier, whereas this effect disappeared among media literacy students. In contrast, a halo effect (whereby the interviewee's overall favorability was influenced by the degree to which participants personally liked the interviewee), which is not at all related to the content of media literacy education, was evident among both the students
Peer, E. & Solomon, L., 2012. Professionally biased: Misestimations of driving speed, journey time and time-savings among taxi and car drivers. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol 7, Iss 2, Pp 165-172 (2012), (2), p.165. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract
People make systematic and predictable mistakes regarding estimations of average speed and journey time. In addition, people have been shown to commit a time-saving bias by underestimating the time that can be saved when increasing from a low speed and overestimating the time that can be saved when increasing from a relatively high speed. These misestimations have been shown to relate to biases in judgments of the speed required to arrive at a specific time and to choosing unduly high speed. Professional drivers, such as taxi drivers, might be less susceptible to these biases due to their increased driving experience. In the current study, we interviewed taxi drivers about a journey they were currently making and examined their estimations of journey time, average speed and time savings. Compared to a group of non-professional car drivers, taxi drivers showed the same considerable misestimations of driving speed, journey time and time savings as non-professionals. However, overestimat
2011
Peer, E., 2011. The time-saving bias, speed choices and driving behavior. Transportation Research Part F: Psychology and Behaviour, 14(Special Issue: Driving Simulation in Traffic Psychology), pp.543 - 554. Available at: The time-saving bias, speed choices and driving behaviorhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1369847811000659. Publisher's VersionAbstract
When drivers are asked to estimate how much time can be saved by increasing speed, they generally underestimate the time saved when increasing from a relatively low speed and overestimate the time saved when increasing from a relatively high speed. This time-saving bias has been demonstrated to affect drivers’ estimations of driving speed as well as drivers’ personal choice of speed. Specifically, drivers with a high time-saving bias chose unduly high speeds, which sometimes results in speeding, more frequently than drivers with a lower degree of the bias. This study sought to determine whether this relationship would be mediated by individual differences in driving behavior – including drivers’ attitudes, norms and habits regarding speeding behavior as well as their level of aberrant driving behavior (committing aggressive or ordinary violations, errors or lapses in driving, measured by the Driver Behaviour Questionnaire). The results showed that the time-saving bias predicted estima
Peer, E. & Gamliel, E., 2011. Too Reliable to Be True? Response Bias as a Potential Source of Inflation in Paper-and-Pencil Questionnaire Reliability. Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, Vol 16, Iss 9, Pp 1-8 (2011), (9), p.1. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract
When respondents answer paper-and-pencil (PP) questionnaires, they sometimes modify their responses to correspond to previously answered items. As a result, this response bias might artificially inflate the reliability of PP questionnaires. We compared the internal consistency of PP questionnaires to computerized questionnaires that presented a different number of items on a computer screen simultaneously. Study 1 showed that a PP questionnaire's internal consistency was higher than that of the same questionnaire presented on a computer screen with one, two or four questions per screen. Study 2 replicated these findings to show that internal consistency was also relatively high when all questions were shown on one screen. This suggests that the differences found in Study 1 were not due to the difference in presentation medium. Thus, this paper suggests that reliability measures of PP questionnaires might be inflated because of a response bias resulting from participants cross-checking
2010
Gamliel, E. & Peer, E., 2010. Attribute framing affects the perceived fairness of health care allocation principles. Judgment and Decision Making, 5(1), p.11. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract
Health care resource allocation is a central moral issue in health policy, and opinions about it have been studied extensively. Allocation situations have typically been described and presented in a positive manner (i.e., who should receive medical aid). On the other hand, the negative valence allocation situation (i.e., who should not receive medical aid) has been relatively neglected. This paper demonstrates how positive versus negative framing of the exact same health care resource allocation situation can affect the perceived fairness of allocation principles. Participants usually perceived non-egalitarian principles (i.e., need, equity and tenure) to be fairer in positively framed situations (i.e., to deliver health care resources to certain patients) than negatively framed situation (i.e., not to deliver health care resources to other patients). However, framing did not affect the perceived fairness of the equality principle (i.e., a random draw). The paper offers a theoretical
Gamliel, E. & Peer, E., 2010. The Effect of Framing on the Perceived Fairness of Distributive Justice Principles / השפעת ההיצג על ההוגנות הנתפסת של עקרונות צדק חלוקתי. Megamot / מגמות, 46(4), p.626. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract
בידי החברה ומוסדותיה משאבים רבים המחולקים לציבור האזרחים לפי עקרונות שונים. חשיבות רבה יש לחלוקה של המשאבים לפי עקרונות שהאזרחים רואים בהם עקרונות צודקים והוגנים. באמצעות סדרת מחקרים אנו מראים במאמר זה שאנשים מייחסים לאותו עקרון חלוקה מידה שונה של הוגנות, כאשר מוצגים להם "צדדים שונים של אותו המטבע": כאשר החלוקה מוצגת בהיצג חיובי (על-ידי השאלה למי לתת משאב מוגבל), אנשים עשויים להעריך עיקרון אי-שוויוני כהוגן יותר ממצב חלוקה זהה המוצג באופן שלילי (על-ידי השאלה ממי יש למנוע את אותו משאב מוגבל). תופעה זו שוחזרה עבור חלוקת משאבים מסוגים שונים ועבור עקרונות חלוקה אי-שוויוניים שונים, המבוססים על מצוינות, ותק, יכולת, מאמץ, או צורך במשאב. לא נמצאה השפעה דומה של ההיצג עבור עקרון שוויון ההזדמנויות, שבו חלוקה של משאבים מוגבלים נעשית באמצעות הגרלה. המאמר מציע הסברים תאורטיים אפשריים להשפעת ההיצג על ההוגנות הנתפסת של עקרונות חלוקה אי-שוויוניים המייצגים צדק חלוקתי, דן במשמעויות ובהשלכות של התופעה ומציע מחקרי המשך. Society and its institutions have many resources which are allocated to the public acco
Peer, E., 2010. Exploring the time-saving bias: How drivers misestimate time saved when increasing speed. Judgment and Decision Making, 5(7), p.477. Available at: . Publisher's VersionAbstract
According to the time-saving bias, drivers underestimate the time saved when increasing from a low speed and overestimate the time saved when increasing from a relatively high speed. Previous research used a specific type of task –- drivers were asked to estimate time saved when increasing speed and to give a numeric response –- to show this. The present research conducted two studies with multiple questions to show that the time-saving bias occurs in other tasks. Study 1 found that drivers committed the time-saving bias when asked to estimate (a) the time saved when increasing speed or (b) the distance that can be completed at a given time when increasing speed or (c) the speed required to complete a given distance in decreasing times. Study 2 showed no major differences in estimations of time saved compared to estimations of the remaining journey time and also between responses given on a numeric scale versus a visual analog scale. Study 3 tested two possible explanations for the